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NO7'ES
left unanswered and it is questionable whether its justifications out-
weigh either the doctrinal abberations or the individual injustice to
this defendant.
DANIEL ENGELSTEIN
Freedom of Information Act—Exemption (4)—Research Designs
Contained in Grant Applications—Washington Research Project, Inc.
v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare' — in 1966 Congress
enacted the Freedom of Information Act 2 (FOIA) to "[open] adminis-
trative processes to the scrutiny of the press and general public ... . "3
The Act provided that federal agencies shall make information in
their possession available to the public, in some cases through publica-
tion in the Federal Register," and in others through availability for in-
spection and copying.' Exemptions were provided for certain types of
information' as to which Congress apparently concluded that the
government's interest in non-disclosure outweighed the public's in-
' terest in disclosure.' Jurisdiction was vested by the Act in the United
States district courts to enjoin an agency from withholding records
and to order the production of any records improperly withheld.' In
such cases, the court shall determine the matter de novo and the bur-
den is on the agency to sustain its action."
In 1973, Washington Research Project, Inc. brought an action
under the FOIA in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), to compel disclosure of research designs contained in grant
applications pertaining to several specifically identified research
projects." These projects had been approved and funded by the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), a unit of the Public Health
Service of HEW." HEW contended" that the information was ex-
' 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir, 1974).
5 U.S.C. 552 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV. 1974). The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) was first enacted in 1966. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80
Stat. 250. amending Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324. 43, 60 Stat. 238 (1946). It
was amended in 1967 by Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54. Pub. L.
No. 90-23 was in turn amended by Act of Nov. 21,1974, Pub, L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 156 1 .
3
 Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 17 (1974).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970).
fi 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970), as amended, (Stipp. IV, 1974).
5 U.S.C. § 55204 (1970), as amended, (Sapp. IV, 1974).
'Sonde v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, (Stipp. IV, 1974).
Id.
Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929, 931 (D.D.C.
1973).
"Id.
" Id. at 936.
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Since 1966 there has been considerable litigation over the ap-
propriate scope of exemption (4) and over the procedures to be fol-
lowed by a court in determining whether certain information fits
within the exemption. This casenote will analyze the different re-
quirements of exemption (4) and examine the extent to which the
Washington Research interpretation of these statutory requirements is
consistent with prior and subsequent case law. Next, policy aspects of
Washington Research will be considered, with primary focus on the re-
percussions which the decision may have in the scientific community.
Finally, this casenote will suggest a possible amendment to the Act
necessary to bring the language of exemption (4), as interpreted in
Washington Research, into closer harmony with the congressional
policies behind the exemption.
Essential to a complete understanding of the Washington Research
decision is a complete understanding of exemption (4). Exemption (4)
protects from forced disclosure "trade secrets and commercial or fi-
nancial information obtained from aperson and privileged or
confidential."22 Information which qualifies may be withheld from
disclosure to third parties by federal agencies. The most commonly
accepted definition of "trade secret" is "any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over com-
petitors who do not know or use it." 23 An element common to most
definitions of "trade secret" is actual use of the secret in a trade or
business. 24
 The Washington Research court found, in effect, that a sci-
entist doing research on a government grant rather than for the pur-
pose of inventing a marketable device is not engaged in a trade or
business, and held that a research design is not a trade secret in the
hands of such a scientist because he or she does not have a trade or
commercial interest in it." The court apparently overlooked the simi-
larity that such a scientist bears to an independent contractor: he
competes with others like himself for the right to do research which
the government believes needs to be done and is willing to pay him to
do. Such a person may be viewed as engaged in a trade or business.
However, the Washington Research court's interpretation of "trade se-
cret" is in accord with that given to that phrase by most state courts,"
and it is probably best that the state and federal definitions of "trade
secret" be consistent, to avoid confusion.
Exemption (4) also protects "commercial or financial information
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
23 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939). See 12 BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS, MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 at 2-3 — 2-4 (1975), and cases cited
therein.
" 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 at 2-8.5 (1975).
25 504 F.2d at 244-45
26 See cases cited in 12 BUSINESS ORGAN litATIONS, MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2,01
at 2-3 to 2-4 (1975).
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obtained from a person and privileged or confidential."27 The proper
interpretation of this phrase has been the subject of frequent
litigation. 28
 One of the first questions to arise was whether the phrase
created one classification for "commercial or financial information
which is obtained from a person and which is privileged or confiden-
tial," or whether it created two classifications for "commercial or fi-
nancial information which is obtained from a person" and for infor-
mation which is "privileged or confidential." The first reading has
been criticized as contrary to congressional intent; 28 however, given
the actual arrangement of the words in the exemption, the first read-
ing has been considered more logical." While the second reading was
endorsed by one of the first decisions under the Act,3 ' this decision
has not been followed. Indeed, it now seems well settled that items
which are not trade secrets must be both commercial or financial and
privileged or confidential in order to fall within the exemption."
A second question under this phrase of the exemption concerns
the interpretation of the words "commercial or financial." 33 Under
prior case law, "commercial or financial" has been interpreted in its
"trade," "commerce" or "business" aspects." This is the manner in
which "commercial or financial" was interpreted in Washington
Research, 35 and to this extent the decision is consistent with prior law.
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
25 See, e.g., National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir.
1974), and cases cited therein; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392-F. Supp.
1246 (E.D. Va. 1974).
" Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 787 -92
(1967); UNrren STA'res Al-FORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM ON TOE PUBLIC INFORMATION
SECTION OF 11/E ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT (1968), reprinted in 20 An. L. Rev. 263,
300-02 (1968).
35 Davis. The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cut. L. Rev. 761, 787
(1967).
3 ' Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D.P.R. 1967).
32
 National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
33 Another question which has arisen tinder the exemption concerns the meaning
of the language "obtained from a person." It has been held that this phrase means that
the document must have been received by the agency from a person outside the gov-
enunent. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C.
Cir. 197(}); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F.
Supp. 796, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363, 1366 (2d Cir. 1971).
Such an interpretation is necessary in order to prevent agencies from being able to
withhold documents otherwise clearly subject to disclosure simply by passing them from
agency to agency. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., supra at 582; S.
Rey. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1966). It should be pointed out, however, that once a document has been obtained
from a person outside the government and is otherwise within the exemption, that
document does not lose its protection from disclosure if it is passed from one agency to
another. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., supra at 582.
" See, e.g., National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
35 504 F.2d at 244-45.
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However, two cases decided since Washington Research apply the ex-
emption to create a non-business, individual right of privacy in finan-
cial information." In Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department
of Agriculture," the United States Court of' Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit stated that while the exemption exists primarily to
protect trade secrets, it also protects individuals from the disclosure of
privileged or confidential financial information." The court went on
to hold that a report of the United States Department of Agriculture
on its investigation of governmental housing discrimination in
Florida was excepted from forced disclosure by exemption (4), be-
cause it included intimate, detailed information given by, and with re-
spect to, borrowers and applicants for loans that was "implicitly and
unquestionably not the kind of information which would customarily
be released to the public by the persons from whom it was obtained. 39
Some of the information was clearly financial in nature, but a large
part of it was only tangentially so." Nevertheless, the tenor of the
opinion points to the application of exemption (4) to much of the
information.'
Essentially the same result was reached in Dillow v. Schultz,' in
which it was held that almost the entire Customs Declaration form
completed by designated persons entering the United States was ex-
cepted from forced disclosure by exemption (4). 4" The court reasoned
that much of the information on the form "is confidential information
that would not customarily be disclosed to the public by the person
from whom it was obtained, and also that public disclosure of the in-
formation poses the likelihood of harm to legitimate private
3° Rural Housing Alliance v. United States DeVi. of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 78
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326, 329 (D.D.C. 1974).
" 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
3B Id. at 78.
39 1d. at 79.
40-1-he report included information
regarding the marital status or such borrowers and applicants, the number
and the legitimacy of their children, and grandchildren, and the identity
of the fathers of their children; information as to their medical condition
and history, including, statements as to surgery and die possibility of future
pregnancies; information as to their occupations and work history and the
amounts and sources of their annual income, including the amount of wel-
fare payments received; information as to their ownership of property; in-
formation as to their habits with respect to the consumption of alcoholic
beverages; information as to family lights which had occurred; informa-
tion from their employers as to their reliability as employees; information
as to their reputation in the community; information as to the risks in-
volved in extending credit to them; and other infO•mation of a clearly per-
sonal and confidential nature.
Id. at 75.76 n.4.
41 Id, at 75-76, 78-79.
" 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974).
43 1d. at 329.
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interests."" Again, not all of the information was financial," but the
court held that only the names and addresses of those who filled out
the forms must be disclosed." The holdings in these two cases argu-
ably raise the implication that information about an individual, not fi-
nancial in itself but of such a nature that its disclosure could have se-
vere adverse consequences for the financial status of that individual, is
"commercial or financial" and, as such, can be withheld under exemp-
tion (4).
If this interpretation is correct, these cases support the classifica-
tion of research proposals as such financial information. The interest
of the scientist in his information is not simply the same as the in-
terest of any employee in professional recognition and reward, as the
Washington Research court stated. While it is true that a grant-seeking
scientist may be employed by a university, he receives the money with
which he pays the costs of his research not from his nominal
employer,'" but from the government. 48 In his relationship with the
government, as noted earlier, he can be said to be self-employed and
in competition with other scientists" for what may be characterized as
government contracts to do research. The awarding of these grants is
based upon many factors, including the potential of the research design. 5 °
44 Id.
45
 The form contained spaces for (1) name, (2) date of birth, (3) vessel or airline
and flight number, (4) citizenship, (5) residence, (6) permanent address, (7) address
while in the United States, (8) name and relationship of accompanying family mem-
bers, (9) whether declarant or anyone in his party is carrying agricultural or meat prod-
ucts or pets, (10) whether declarant or anyone else in his party is carrying more than
$5,000 in coin, currency or negotiable instruments, (II) certification that all of the
above information is true, accurate and complete, (12) if a non-citizen, the place where
declarant's visa was issued, (13) the date when it was issued, and (14) a detailed list of
all articles acquired abroad which are now in declarant's possession, with price informa-
tion. Id. at 328.
46 Id. at 329.
41 It is true that some federal government grant programs award grants to the
college or university which employs the scientist rather than to the scientist himself, and
require that the college or university contribute to the support of the project for which
the grant is awarded. See generally ANNUAL. REGISTER OF GRANT SUPPORT 1973/1974, 382,
386-87, 393, 399 (D. Sclar ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REGISTER]. However,
many such grants including some of those which are most heavily funded, can also be
made to individuals. Id. at 380-81, 399, 402, 424. Also, even where the grant is made to
the educational institution, frequently it is made for the work of a specific scientist or
group of scientists after consideration of the promise of the research proposal drawn
up by the scientist or scientists. See, e.g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW,
366 F. Supp. 929, 934 (D.D.C. 1973). Thus it is still the scientists, rather than the uni-
versities, which are competing.
" Although there are many non-governmental sources of grants for scientific re-
search, a comparison of the amounts of money available from the various sources re-
veals that the federal government is the largest source of such funding. See generally
ANNUAL REGISTER , Supra note 47, at 375-604.
49 See generally Siegel, Priority Assertion and Early Disclosure Through Author Abstracts,
15 IDEA 268 (1971).
" See, e.g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929, 934
(D.D.C. 1973).
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There is generally not enough money to go around, 5 ' so that misap-
propriation of a scientist's research design can have the same effect
upon his competitive position that misappropriation of a trade secret
can have upon a business. Thus, although research designs contained
in grant proposals are not commercial or financial in themselves, their
disclosure would have such an impact upon the competitive positions
of scientists that such information should be exempted under the
same rationale which apparently was applied in Ditlow and Rural Hous-
ing Alliance.' 2
The much narrower interpretation of "commercial or financial"
in Washington Research may have been based on the rule that even if
non-disclosure would serve the policies behind an exemption, the dis-
trict courts do not have equitable jurisdiction under the FOIA to allow
non-disclosure if the technical requirements of the exemption are not
met.53 This reading of the FOIA —one which forbids the use of
equitable discretion to expand the exemptions of the Act — has been
expressly adopted in several cases, 54 although there are decisions to
the contrary. 55
A comprehensive discussion of the argument against expansion
of the exemptions through the use of equitable discretion is contained
in Soucie v. David. 56 In that case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the legislative in-
tent, as expressed in both the Act itself and in the Senate report, was
clearly to exercise the power of Congress to limit, if not totally elimi-
nate, the ordinarily discretionary boundaries to equitable relief." The
court pointed out that the FOIA was a reaction against prior case law
which had enforced non-disclosure "in the public interest," "for good
cause shown," or because the person seeking disclosure was "not
properly and directly concernecl." 55 The provision in the FOIA that
disclosure is to be made "to any person" precludes a court from
examining the "need" of the person seeking disclosure. 55 Further-
" Compare figures for "Number of Applicants „ ." with figures for "Nutni)er ()I'
Awards" in ANNUAL REGismi, supra mac 47, at 375-604.
H See text at notes 36-46.(upra,
"See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 f.2d 670, 677.78 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Sonde v.
David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" Id.
H Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974); Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 806 (S.D.
N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363, 1366 (2d Cir. 1971). The leading opinion in
favor of the use of equitable discretion to broaden the coverage of the exceptions is
Consumers Union, wherein the court held certain results of the V.A.'s hearing aid testing
program to be exempt from disclosure pursuant to its equitable jurisdiction, even
though the information did not fit any of the stated exemptions in the Act. 301 F.
Supp. at 798.
" 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 1076.
"Id. The quoted language is from Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 1,
80 Stat. 383.
" 448 F.2d at 1077.
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more, the inclusion in the Act of the language "[dills section does not
authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of rec-
cords to the public, except as specifically stated in this section," was
read by the court as specifically limiting the discretion of the courts. 6°
The Soucie court commented that the legislature, by providing specific
exemptions, had struck "a balance among factors which would ordi-
narily be deemed relevant to the exercise of equitable discretion," 61
and any. tinkering by the courts is likely to upset that balance. 62
 The
court also noted that the Senate report supports this view. 63 The con-
trary view contained in the House report 64 was discounted, on the
ground that only the Senate report was considered by both houses of
Congress."
In addition to the specific statutory provision cited in Soucie,
there is also the policy of the FOIA in favor of disclosure, 68 which
militates against the use of equitable discretion to impede disclosure in
FOIA cases, and particularly against the use of such discretion to
broaden the exemptions. Indeed, a court interested in asserting its
equitable discretion should consider the strong mandate of the Act in
favor of disclosure as a mandate to use that discretion to narrow the
exemptions. This is precisely what was done in National Parks and Con-
servation Association v. Morton." There, the court required an agency to
show not only that its records met the technical requirements of con-
fidentiality and were commercial or financial, but also that non-
disclosure of the records was consistent with the policies behind the
Act." If this theory of the use of equitable discretion in FOIA cases
only to narrow the exemptions and not to broaden them is correct,
then the expansive interpretations of Dillow and Rural Housing Alliance
are incorrect, and Washington Research is a proper decision under the
Act as presently written.
It is useful to compare the positions of university and industry
scientists under the narrow interpretation of "commercial or financial"
adopted by the Washington Research court." Some university scientists
66
	 quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
°' 448 F.2d at 1077.
" Id.
63 Id., citing S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
64 H.R. REP. No. 1997, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
95 448 F.2d at 1077, n.39.
64 See Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 17 (1974).
" 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The information sought in this case consisted of
"audits conducted upon the books of companies operating concessions in national
parks, annual financial statements filed by the concessioners with the National Park
Service and other financial information." Id. at 770. The court remanded the case to
the district court for consideration of whether this information was "confidential" under
tests set forth by the court. Id. at 771. These tests are discussed in the text at notes
82-89, infra.
es Id, at 767.
69 Many of the assertions about the workings of the scientific community which
are to follow are derived in whole or in part from conversations with various members
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may be commercially oriented, and may set up businesses to exploit
their ideas for profit. The research designs of such scientists would
probably qualify as "commercial or financial" under Washington
Research. 7° However, many scientists are not commercially oriented
and have no intention of directly exploiting their ideas for profit. To
secure protection under exemption (4), these scientists could assert
only their interest as. competitors with other grant-seeking scientists,
an interest which was rejected as not "commercial or financial" in
Washington Research."
In some cases, university scientists may be required, as a condi-
tion of employment, to sign agreements which give to the universities
all rights to inventions developed by the scientists while they are em-
ployed by the universities." Under these agreements, the universities
may be able to step in and prevent disclosure under Washington Re-
search, due to their commercial interest created by the agreement.
However, it is possible that even here, since research done by many
university scientists is not oriented toward applications of technology
suitable for immediate commercial exploitation, a court might hold a
university's commercial interest to be too speculative to be worthy of
protection.
In comparison, the research designs of many industry scientists
are not in any way subject to the FOIA. Many industry scientists do
not rely on government grants or contracts for their funding, 73 and
thus their research designs are not submitted to the federal govern-
ment, and are not subject to the FOIA, which reaches only informa-
tion in the hands of federal agencies:" However, the research designs
of some industry scientists are subject to the FOIA because their com-
panies fund their research at least partially by applying for and ob-
taining government grants or contracts. 75
 The research designs of
these scientists may be protected from disclosure under Washington
Research, because such scientists can assert the argument concerning
of an atomic physics research group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
Cambridge, Massachusetts over the past three years.
T " See 504 F.2d at 244 11.6.
7 ' Id. at 244.
"12 See, e.g., INVENTION AND COPYRIGHT AGREEMENT For M.I.T.
Academic Staff and Students Engaged on Sponsored Research or Using Institute
Facilities, obtained from the Division of Sponsored Research, Patent Section, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. A copy of this agreement
is on file at the offices of the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review.
73
 Many of the most heavily funded governmental grant programs are available
only to non-prolit organizations, such as colleges and universities and research organi-
zations whose primary purpose is scientific research. See, e.g., ANNUAL RF.GISTER, supra
note 47, at 380, 382, 386-87, 393, 416, 428. Others are available to profit-making or-
ganizations only under exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., id. at 399.
" 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
74
 There are some governmental grant programs which are open to profit-
making companies. See, e.g., ANNUAL REGISTER, supra note 47, at 381, 402, 424. Other
programs make only contracts, and not grants, available to profit-making companies.
See, e.g., id. at 380, 381, 387, 426.
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their own competitive position within the scientific community which
was rejected in Washington Research for their academic counterparts.
More importantly, however, the company employing the scientist can
make two arguments against disclosure, both of which are likely to
succeed under Washington Research. The first of these concerns any in-
terest which the company may have under its government grant or
research contract in the commercial exploitation of scientific processes
and results which grow out of work under that contract. This interest
is clearly protected, since these items are likely to be trade secrets,
which are expressly protected under exemption (4). 76
The second company argument concerns the need for the com-
pany to maintain its competitive position as against other companies
which contract with the government or receive government grants to
do research. Any grant or contract-receiving company will probably
have this interest, but it will be most significant with respect to any
profit-making companies which agree with the government not to
make any commercial use of their research results, and thus are able
to make a profit only through continued success in obtaining research
contracts. This argument is analagous to the scientist's asserted in-
terest in his individual competitive position. However, within this con-
text the argument is more likely to be accepted by the courts, simply
because it is being asserted by a profit-seeking company rather than
by an individual."
The final requirement for information to be protected under
exemption (4) is that the information must be "privileged or
confidential."" Because the court in Washington Research found
neither a trade secret nor a commercial or financial interest, it did not
have occasion to consider this requirement of privilege or confiden-
tiality. However, to ensure a complete understanding of exemption
(4), a discussion of this requirement is necessary.
Under prior case law, the test for confidentiality turned on
whether the document contained information which would not cus-
tomarily be released to the public by the person from whom it was
obtained." The fact that the information was revealed to the govern-
ment under the express promise by the government that the informa-
tion would be kept confidential had been held to be another factor to
be considered by courts," but insufficient in itself to create confiden-
tiality under the exemption. 8 '
76
 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
" 504 F,2d at 244 n.6.
7 " See text at note 32, supra.
19 See, e.g., Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578,
582 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
m° General Serv. Administration v. Benson, 415 F,2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969);
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796,
803-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363, 1366 (2d Cir. 1971).
" Petkas v. Swats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450
F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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In 1974, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in National Parks and Conservation Associa-
tion v. Morton" expanded the test to be used in determining confiden-
tiality. In addition to proving that, objectively, the provider of infor-
mation to the government would not customarily reveal that information
to the public, 83 the court held that an agency seeking to prevent disclo-
sure under exemption (4) must also establish that non-disclosure is jus-
tified by one of the legislative' purposes underlying the exemption, 84
thus opening the door to use of its equitable discretion to narrow the
exemption. The court discussed two such legislative purposes. The
first of these concerned the fact that government policy-makers need
access to commercial and financial data, and recognized that assur-
ances of confidentiality are often necessary in order for businesses to
allow such access voluntarily." To justify non-disclosure under this
policy, an agency must demonstrate that disclosure would impair the
government's ability to obtain similar information in the future." The
second legislative purpose concerned the protection of those who are
obligated by law to submit information to the government." The
court stated that an agency could justify non-disclosure under this pol-
icy if it could demonstrate that disclosure would cause "substantial
harm" to the competitive position of such a person." The court left
open the possibility that there might be other governmental interests
which would qualify as such legislative purposes, for example, en-
, couragement of compliance With laws requiring disclosure of data to
the government, or "program effectiveness." 8 "
52
 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
"Id. at 766.
84
 Id. at 767.
" id.
86 Id. at 770. The National Park court presumed that such impairment could not
exist in that case, since the provider of the information to the government in National
Parks was required by law to provide it. Id,
" Id. at 768.
88 Id. at 770.
" Id., n,17. One of the other major issues with which the courts have had to deal
in exemption (4) cases, as well as under other sections of the FOIA, concerns the nature
of proof required of an agency which desires to withhold a document under the ex-
emption. Initially, an agency prevailed by coming into court in an FOIA case with af-
fidavits containing only broad and sweeping conclusory allegations that a single docu-
ment, or a huge mass of documents, came within the exemption. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers
Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'g 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968).
However, to permit non-disclosure solely on the basis of conclusory affidavits of
the agency arguing for non-disclosure would effectively place disclosure totally within
the discretion of the agency, since the party seeking disclosure cannot know the con-
tents of the documents and thus cannot contest the conclusions of the affidavits, Note,
The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 CoLum. L. REV. 895, 950
(1974). Such a result would read out of the Act the requirement that the district court
"shall determine the matter de novo" and also the requirement that "the burden is on
the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, (Stipp. IV,
1974),
In 1973, in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), it was held that in-
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It is submitted that, in general, research designs, proposed
methods and specific goals of scientific research proposals included in
grant applications, which were the type of information at stake in
Washington Research, clearly meet the test of confidentiality enunciated
in National Parks. Such information is not customarily revealed, either
to the public or to competing scientists, before work on the experi-
ments is begun." Even after work is in progress, such information is
not generally revealed in the detail with which it' is submitted in grant
applications and progress reports."' Only after he has completed
enough of his experiment to be ready to present his results to his col-
leagues and collect the credit which is his reward does the scientist re-
veal the details of his work. 12 Such partial and temporary professional
secrets should come within the protection of the exemption, in the
same way that trade secrets do. Trade secrets often consist not of an
entire project, but rather of some particular process or ingredient in
the project."" Furthermore, trade secrets often do not remain trade
secrets forever; they are protected only as long as they are not re-
vealed by the owner or as long as similar processes or ingredients are
not developed independently by others in the same field."' Trade se-
crets obviously are protected under exemption (4) only to the extent
that, and for as long as, they remain secret. The same could be and
should be done for the scientific information at stake here.
In addition, information such as that involved in Washington
Research meets the policy tests enunciated in National Parks. Scientists
are obligated to supply extremely detailed research designs to .
 the ap-
propriate governmental agencies in order to obtain the government's
financial backing for their research," and there is relatively little
stead of providing conclusory and generalized allegations, agencies must specify in de-
tail which portions of' a document or group of documents arc exempt and which are
disclosable, and must itemize and index the documents and correlate this indexing with
the various justifications for the refusal to disclose. Id. at 826-28. This decision is in ac-
cord with the general policy of the Act to encourage disclosure, since the requirement
of such specificity and detail and the verification of all such claims will encourage agen-
cies to claim exemptions only when it is at least arguable that they are justified. But see
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973) (detailed affidavits
alone held sufficient under exemption (5)). In 1974, in Pacific Architects & Eng'rs, Inc.
v. Renegotiation Lid., 505 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court applied Vaughn and
enunciated standards for the extremely detailed allegations required in support of a
claim of confide.ntiality under exemption (4). Id. at 385.
9° This assertion is based upon private conversations with members of an atomic
physics research group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge,
Massachuset ts.
91 Id.
"See generally Merton. Behavior Patterns of Scientists, 38 Am. SCnoI.AR 197 (1969).
93 12 Bum NESS ORGANIZATIONS, MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.09(2) (1975).
" R. ELLIS. TRADE SECRETS §§ 24, 26, 27 (1953); RESTATEMENT Or Towns § 757
comment a, at 4 (1939).
" See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY MANUAL: ORANTS ADMINIS.
TRxrioN, 5700.1, Pt. I, ch. 2, 2(b)(13) (April 7, 1972).
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non-governmental backing available." Therefore, under National
Parks, if the disclosure of this information would cause "substantial
harm" to the competitive position of the scientist, 97 in addition to
meeting the traditional test of confidentiality enunciated above, the
governmental agency concerned would be justified in not disclosing
the information under the additional policy requirement of National
Parks. Furthermore, it was contended by HEW in Washington Research
that such substantial harm would result from disclosure because
"ideas are a researcher's 'stock-in-trade.' " Their misap-
propriation, which, it is claimed, would be facilitated by
premature disclosure, deprives him of the career advance-
ment and attendant material rewards in which the academic
and scientific market deals, in much the same way that mis-
appropriation of trade information in the commercial
world deprives one of a competitive advantage."
This contention finds support in the writings of one of the leading
historians of science in the area of competition among scientists:"
There is at least a possibility of such harm to competitive advantage in
cases such as Washington Research, and parties opposing disclosure in
such cases ought to be allowed to prove such harm. They should not
have to overcome a presumption, best expressed by the party seeking
disclosure in Washington Research, that "secrecy is antithetical to the
philosophical values of science."'"
However, the policy considerations enunciated in National Parks
only help to define one test of exemption (4), namely, confidentiality.
With respect to the other requirements of the exemption, it appears
that the Washington Research decision was correct as a matter of pure
statutory interpretation, given the present wording of the Act, in spite
of the fact that the decision is in conflict with the Attorney General's
Memorandum on the FOIA.'" First, research designs are clearly not
" See note 48 supra.
It should be noted that Rural Housing Alliance v, United States Dept of Ag-
riculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974), discussed in text at note 37 supra, and Dillow v.
Schultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974), discussed in text at note 42 supra, were con-
cerned with the individual rather than corporate versions of "substantial harm" to com-
petitive position.
" 504 F.2d at 244. See Misani v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 83 N.J. Super. Ct.
1, 198 A.2d 791 (1964), rev'd, 44 N.J. 552, 210 A.2d 609 (1965), in which the Superior
Court recognized the right of a scientist to claim intellectual credit for her work, but
the state supreme court reversed on this issue. See also Hearings on United States Govern-
ment Information Policies and Practices Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Opera-
tions, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3620 (197'2) (testimony of Dr. John F. Sherman, Deputy Di-
rector of the Nat'l Institute of Health).
"" Merton, Behavior Patterns of Scientists, 38 ANI. SCHOLAR 197 (1969).
',See 504 F.2d at 244.
191 UNITED STATES ArroRNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC
INFORMATION SECTION OF THE A Dm xritATI yr: PROCEDURE Acr (1967), reprinted in 20
AD. L. REV. 263 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERALS MEMORANDUM], which
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traditional trade secrets in the hands of scientists.'° 2 Secondly, they
are clearly not commercial or financial information in the narrow
business/manufacturing context.' 03 Finally, a narrow reading of the
Act is required by the rule concerning the use of equitable
descretion,'" the general policy of the Act in favor of disclosure' 05
and by the proviso at the end of the Act that the Act does not au-
thorize the withholding of records except for the reasons specifically
stated.'"
It is submitted, however, that as a matter of social and economic
policy the Washington Research decision is misguided. While it is true
that the FOIA is a mandate for disclosure, exemptions protect impor-
tant governmental or private interests which would be irreparably
harmed by disclosure.'" It is submitted that the full disclosure of re-
search designs mandated by Washington Research will cause irreparable
was published shortly after the passage of the FOIA, states:
In view of the specific statements in both the Senate and House re-
ports that technical data submitted by an applicant for a loan would he.cov-
ered, and the House report's inclusion of "scientific or manufacturing
processes or developments," it seems reasonable to construe this exemp-
tion as covering technical or scientific data or other information submitted
in or with an application for a research grant or in or with a report while
research is in progress.
20 AD. L. REV. at 302. See also Saloschin, Science and secrecy — the impact cf Federal Law, 10
IEEE SPECTRUM 68 (1973), It should also be noted that several agencies gave the same
broad reading to exemption (4) in their regulations setting forth the manner in which
each of them would implement the FOIA, perhaps in reliance on the ATTORNEY
GENERALS MEMORANDUM, supra. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 5.71(c) and 5 Appendix (1974)
(HEW); 32 C.F.R. 5 701.1(h)(4)(ii), (iv) (1974) (Navy); 32 C.F.R. 	 518.10(d)(2), (4)
(1974) (Army); 32 C.F.R.	 286.8(b)(4)(ii), (iv) (1974) (Department of Defense). The
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM could be criticized for depending too much on the
House report, which read the exclusion more broadly but was not considered by both
houses of Congress, and for depending too little on the Senate report, which read the
exclusion more narrowly and was considered by both houses. See, Soucie v. David, 448
F.2d 1067, 1077 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971). It should be noted that since Washington
Research, some of these agencies have rewritten their regulations. Compare, 32 C.F.R.
§ 701.1 (h)(4)00, (iv) (1974) with 32 C.F.R. § 701.24(d)(I) (1975) (Navy); 32 C.F.R. §
518.10(d)(2), (4) (1974) with 32 C.F.R. § 518.14(d) (1975) (Army); 32 C.F.R. §
286.8(b)(4)(ii), (iv) (1974) with 32 C.F.R. § 286.6(c)(4) (1975) (Department of Defense).
' 62 See text at notes 23-24 supra.
103 See text at notes 33-35 ,supra. Compare the facts of Washington Research, dis-
cussed in text at note 10, supra, with those of National Parks Conservation Ass'n v, Morton,
498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Gk. 1974), discussed in note 67, supra, and with those of Grumman
Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 579, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
104 See text at notes 53.68 supra.
1 " See, e.g., Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. I, 17 (1974).
106 See text at notes 60-61 ,supra.
1 " For example, exemption (5), 5 U.S.C. § 552(6)(5) (1970), which protects
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters," has been held to be concerned
with the governmental and public interest in protecting "deliberative or policy-making
processes," Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973), under
the theory that without such protection, officials will not feel free to be candid, and
government policy makers will not have the benefit of a truly free exchange of ideas
upon which to base a choice of action. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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harm to the progress of scientific research.
The scientific community is competitive. Secrecy may be "an-
tithetical to the philosophical values of science,"" 8 but it is not an-
tithetical to customary practice in the scientific field. Many, if not
most, scientists used to keep not only their plans but even their ex-
perimental results secret for years out of fear that someone else would
find out about their work, copy it, and claim the credit for doing it
first.'" Even today there are some scientists who, while willing to pub-
lish preliminary results of experiments, publish such results in a man-
ner which reveals little to potential competitors, and wait to publish
full details until their experiments are completely finished and the re-
sults are clear, for fear that otherwise someone else will beat them to
the final result.'" The system of scientific conferences and journals
was established at least in part as a mechanism through which scien-
tists could be assured of receiving credit for their work by prompt
publication under controlled conditions to all of their peers at once."'
If the decision in Washington Research is allowed to stand, it is submit-
ted that the present system .by which scientific research is carried out
could very well be destroyed. ' 2 Under this system, scientists who have
relatively little money and manpower at their disposal have at least a
chance to become successful with a good idea, even though it may
take them longer to complete an experiment than it would take some-
one with more money and manpower.
Under Washington Research, any scientist could have access to the
government-backed brainstorms of his fellows. The scientist with more
money and manpower, who can do an experiment more quickly can
turn these ideas to his own advantage by publishing his results first.
This could have the long-range effect of making it much more dif-
ficult for new scientists, who have not yet had the chance to develop
contacts and professional reputations for good, interesting, successful,
1 " See 504 F.2d at 244.
"" Merton, Behavior Patterns of Scientist, 38 Am. SCHOLAR 197, 209 (1969); Siegel,
Priority Assertion and Early Disclosure through Author Abstracts, 15 IDEA 268, 271.72
(1971).
"" Siegel, Priority Assertion and Early Disclosure through Author Abstracts, 15 IDEA
268, 271 (1971),
" 1 Merton, Behavior Patterns of Scientists, 38 AM, Scommt 197, 209-11) (1969).
"' For a scientist's view of the negative impact of Washington Research on scientific
research, see Letter from Edward M. horn, Inter-Assembly Counsel NI H-NIMH, Na-
tional Institutes of Health, to Editor, in 190 So iiNct-: 736 (Nov. 21, 1975). The letter
stated, in part:
'Phis decision raises important questions for the scientific community. For
example, if scientists generally avail themselves of their legal right to ob-
tain copies of their colleagues' grant applications, will applicants include
less information in their applications, thus making it more difficult for
study sections to evaluate them? Will colleagues with shared scientific goals
tend to hecome secretive competitors, and will meaningful scientific ex-
change he reduced?
Korn noted that N11.1 has received several hundred requests for copies of grant applica-
tions, "including recently two from the N1H intramural scientific staff." Id.
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